We study asymmetric …rst price auctions in which bidders place their bids sequentially, one after the other and only once. We show that with a strong bidder and a weak bidder already with some asymmetry between the bidders, the expected revenue in the sequential bidding …rst price auction (when the strong bidder bids …rst) may be higher than in the simultaneous bidding …rst price auction as well as second price auction. The expected payo¤ of the weak bidder is also higher in the sequential …rst price auction. Therefore a seller interested in increasing revenue facing asymmetric bidders may …nd it bene…cial to order them and let them bid sequentially instead of simultaneously. In terms of e¢ ciency the sequential bidding auction when the stronger bidder bids …rst achieves lower e¢ ciency than the simultaneous auction. However, when the order is reversed and the asymmetry is large enough the sequential …rst price auction achieves higher e¢ ciency than the simultaneous auction. Finally we show that there exist no monotonicity in the number of bidders in the sequential bidding auction and discuss the optimal order of bidders.
a second price auction (SPA) when bidders are asymmetric. 1 Partial results exist for di¤erent assumptions on the distribution of bidders values.
Here we propose a simple modi…cation of the …rst price auction in which bidders bid sequentially and only once. We order the bidders according to some order and bidder i observes the bids of previous bidders 1; :::; i 1 when she places her own bid. As in the standard …rst price auction, the winner is the bidder who submitted the highest bid and she pays her bid. All other bidders have a payo¤ of zero. We break ties in favor of later bidders. Thus bidder i wins if her bid is higher than or equal to the bids of bidders 1; ::; i 1 and strictly higher than the bids of bidders i + 1; :::; n. For the two bidders case, even with small asymmetry between bidders, we show that by ordering the bidders such that the strong bidder bids …rst and the weak bidder bids only after the strong bidder does 2 , we increase both the weak bidder's expected payo¤ and the expected revenue compared to the simultaneous auction.
Asymmetry between bidders is common in many auctions. For example when one of the bidders is an incumbent …rm while the other is an entrant …rm it is plausible to assume asymmetry in their valuations for the object (which can be a result of di¤erences in the cost function). Another source for asymmetry may be the seller's preferences over the bidders. In procurement auctions for example it is common that one seller is given an advantage over the other, re ‡ecting better reliability or quality. Legal interventions that are intended for encouraging the participation of the weaker …rm or preferred seller, such as bidding credits and set-asides are prevalent. We know from Myerson (1981) how does the optimal auction when bidders are asymmetric look like. However, this mechanism requires setting di¤erent reserve prices for the bidders which is considered a blunt intervention in favor of the weak bidder and mostly prohibited by law. Moreover the e¢ ciency (the probability that the higher valuation bidder wins the object) of the optimal auction is very low. Our mechanism requires what may be considered a reasonable a¢ rmative action in favor of the weak bidder -giving her the right to bid second. Moreover, as we show below, this mechanism yields a higher e¢ ciency than the optimal one. 3 Our results indicate that already with some asymmetry the weaker …rm should be given the opportunity to bid after the stronger …rm bids. 4 This not only improves the expected payo¤ of the weaker …rm and therefore may increase participation of weaker …rms, but also increases the expected revenue for the seller.
In most common auctions bidders bid simultaneously or equivalently without knowing the bids of their opponents. However, in several settings the seller may approach the bidders one by one creating a sequential 1 Examples exist for both directions -a …rst price auction may either yield a higher or a lower expected revenue than a second price auction but no su¢ cient conditions are yet known for either of the directions. 2 Formally we say that bidder i is stronger than bidder j if the distribution of her valuation, F i , …rst order stochastically dominates the distribution of bidder j's valuation -F j . 3 Deb and Pai (2014) show that almost every outcome of every auction mechanism can be implemented by a symmetric (anonymous) mechanism. This is also true for our mechanism except for the special case where the strong bidder's valuation is drawn from a uniform distribution on an interval twice as large as the interval for the weak bidder. 4 Note that when bidders are symmetric our sequential mechanism does not yield the e¢ cient allocation and therefore yields lower revenue than the revenue which is achieved by a standart FPA or SPA.
bidding game if she discloses the bids of previous bidders. Thus our motivation for studying sequential bidding FPA is a normative one. It does not stem from an existing practice (we are not aware of such a practice) but from the theoretical understanding that altering the common practice to the sequential one may improve its performance.
Remarkably, the dynamic nature of bidding in the sequential bidding auction makes the game more tractable and as a result makes it simple to …nd the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for general distributions and a general number of bidders. This is yet another advantage of the sequential FPA over the simultaneous one where it is extremely di¢ cult to …nd equilibrium behavior and analyze how will changes in the mechanism (such as handicaps or headstarts) a¤ect the bidders'behavior. We therefore suggest that sequential mechanisms be used when bidders are asymmetric to allow for higher revenue, higher participation of weaker bidders and easier prediction of expected behavior. Note moreover that even if the seller does not know the distributions of the bidders'valuations but only that they are asymmetric such that one is strong and the other is weak our results suggest that by ordering them such that the strong bidder bids …rst she will almost always ensure a higher revenue than by a simultaneous auction.
We also examine the e¢ ciency of the sequential …rst price auction. E¢ ciency is de…ned as the probability that the higher valuation bidder wins the object. When the bidders are asymmetric simultaneous …rst price auction does not guarantee full e¢ ciency. This happens because in equilibrium the weaker bidder bids more aggressively than the stronger one (does less shading down of her valuation) and therefore may win even if her valuation is lower than that of the stronger bidder. This is true also for the sequential …rst price auction.
In the sequential auction the second bidder has an exogenous advantage of observing the …rst bid and being able to win by placing the same bid as the …rst bidder. Therefore, the second bidder may win although she has a lower valuation than the …rst one. We show that when the stronger bidder bids …rst the e¢ ciency is lower compared to the simultaneous auction. However, when the order is reversed and the asymmetry between bidders is high enough the e¢ ciency in the sequential auction is higher than in the simultaneous one.
There are only very few analytic solutions to the equilibrium bids in a simultaneous FPA with asymmetric bidders and all of them are restricted to two bidders. Thus our comparison will be restricted to cases in which we could analytically solve for the equilibrium bids in the simultaneous auction. We use results by Maskin and Riley (2000) and by Kaplan and Zamir (2012) in two di¤erent scenarios of asymmetry between two bidders. In the …rst scenario, stretch of probabilities, bidder 2's valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; c] (the weak bidder) while bidder 1's valuation is stretched to the right and is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; c + "] (the strong bidder). In the second scenario, shift of probabilities, bidder 2's valuation is again uniformly distributed on the interval [0; c] (the weak bidder) while bidder 1's valuation is shifted to the right and is uniformly distributed on the interval ["; c + "] (the strong bidder). In both cases Maskin and Riley (2000) prove that a FPA yields a higher expected revenue than a SPA and Kaplan and Zamir (2012) specify the inverse bid functions of the bidders. We show that when asymmetry is high enough (" gets larger) a sequential bidding …rst price auction dominates both FPA and SPA and generates higher expected revenue.
Finally we compare the expected payo¤ of each of the bidders in each of the auctions and show that the ex ante expected payo¤ of the strong bidder is highest in the simultaneous FPA, second highest in the SPA and lowest in the sequential FPA while for the weaker bidder the order is reversed. A weak bidder prefers the sequential auction where she bids second over the simultaneous auction. Therefore a sequential …rst price auction may serve as a tool to increase participation of weak bidders.
Much e¤ort has been put in the last two decades in …nding equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions and ranking FPA and SPA in terms of revenue. Tanno when the weak bidder's distribution falls between a shift and a stretch of the strong bidder's distribution.
Mares and Swinkels (2014) de…ne and discuss the connection between the -concavity of the underlying type distributions and the bidders'bid functions. They are able to determine bounds on the equilibrium behavior in asymmetric auctions.
Not much e¤ort has been devoted to examining auctions in which bidders bid one by one and only once.
Fischer et al (2014) study a very similar model to ours. They assume an exogenous probability of a leak which is the probability that the second bidder will observe the …rst bidder's bid. When this probability is 1 their model coincides with ours. However they only assume symmetric bidders and therefore show (both theoretically and in an experiment) that the sequential bidding game yields less revenue than the simultaneous game. Roberts and Sweeting (2013) study a sequential bidding auction with an entry cost. In their model bidders learn their private valuations only after they decide to enter and pay the entry fee and bids can only be increased by a giving jump each round. The entry decision is therefore dependent on the entry decision of previous bidders and the bidder's own signal. They show that a sequential mechanism can give both buyers and sellers signi…cantly higher payo¤s than the commonly used simultaneous bid auction. In an 
The Model
We consider a sequential bidding …rst price auction with n 2 bidders who bid for a single indivisible object.
Biders bid one by one. Bidder j, 1 j n observes the bids of bidders 1; 2; :::; j 1 and then places a bid b j .
The winner is the bidder who placed the highest bid. We break ties in favor of later bidders. Thus, bidder j wins if her bid is larger than or equal to the bids of bidders 1; :::; j 1 and strictly larger than the bids of bidders j + 1; :::; n. Bidder j's valuation of the object is denoted by v j and is private information to bidder j. It is common knowledge among the bidders that bidder j's valuation v j is drawn from a continuos and twice di¤erentiable distribution F j with a positive density function f j on the interval [a j ; c j ] ; 0 a j < c j .
We also assume that F j has no atom at a j . 5 Our aim is to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium bid strategies of the bidders.
We start by analyzing bidder n's behavior. Bidder n observes the bids of bidders 1; :::; n 1: Let n = max 1 i n 1 b i be the maximal bid of bidders 1; :::; n 1. Bidder n will then either bid n , if v n n or otherwise will bid zero. Therefore, if c n n then bidder n bids zero: b n (v n ; b 1 ; :::; b n 1 ) = 0 for all a n v n c n . If n a n then bidder n bids n : b n (v n ; b 1 ; :::; b n 1 ) = n for all a n v n c n . Finally, if a n < n < c n then,
Bidder n 1 considers the probability that bidder n will bid zero which is her probability of winning. If she bids less than a n then her payo¤ is zero. Otherwise, her maximization problem is given by
where n 1 = max 1 i n 2 b i is the maximal bid of bidders 1; :::; n 2.
We need to consider several cases. First, If c n 1 a n then bidder n 1 can never ensure a positive payo¤. In the following we assume that in this case bidder n 1 bids zero. Obviously she could bid any positive bid smaller than a n and get the same payo¤ but we want to identify the PBE with the smallest possible expected revenue for the sequential auction and therefore assume she bids zero. Thus, whenever v n 1 a n we have b n 1 (v n 1 ) = 0 and the same will be true to any other bidder who knows that her probability of winning is zero.
The …rst order condition for the maximization problem is given by
or equivalently we can derive the inverse bid function as
fn(x) . We need the following condition on F n .
De…nition 1 A continuos and twice di¤ erentiable distribution function F with a positive density f on the interval [a; c] is said to be sequentially regular (SeqR) if the following function
is strictly increasing on the interval [a; c].
In the following we assume that the distribution F n of bidder n's valuation is sequentially regular. This will allow us to de…ne the bid function of bidder n 1 which is the inverse function of Fn (x). Note that if a distribution is a convex function and sequentially regular then it is also regular in terms of the Myerson's
f (x) is a strictly increasing function). 6 Moreover, if F (x) is concave then it is trivially sequentially regular. Finally, note that for bidder
is strictly increasing then
bidder n 2 wins by bidding b > max fa n ; a n 1 g only if v n 1 < b and v n < b and this will remain true for any bidder. Therefore bidder j's maximization problem is given by
and
is a continuos (but not necessarily twice di¤erentiable) distribution function on [min j+1 l n a l ; max j+1 l n c l ] with a positive density function on its support. We would need the following assumption on the distribution functions F 1 ; :::; F n : the function
is sequentially regular on the interval [min 1 l n a l ; max 1 l n c l ] for every 1 j n 1 .
In the following we solve explicitly for two bidders and in section 4 we analyze some results for more than two bidders.
Proposition 1
The following is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the sequential bidding …rst price auction with two bidders if F 2 is sequentially regular. If
Proof. Bidder 2 best responds to bidder 1's behavior since he places the same bid as bidder 1 whenever it is below his valuation. Bidder 1 solves the maximization problem (2) . This together with the assumption that if v 1 a 2 then bidder 1 bids zero since she cannot ensure any positive payo¤ given bidder 2's strategy (as explained above), gives us the described PBE.
Using proposition 1 we can express the expected revenue of the seller in this PBE. Note that with only two bidders the expected revenue of the seller is equal to the expected bid of the …rst bidder (the second bidder either places the same bid or bids zero. Therefore the expected revenue of the seller is given by
The following example is with uniform distributions and it applies to the …rst two scenarios we examine below.
Example 1
In the next section we use the above results to compare the expected revenue in the PBE of the sequential bidding …rst price auction with the expected revenue of a simultaneous bidding …rst price and second price auctions. We follow Maskin and Riley (2000) and examine two cases of asymmetry while using Kaplan and Zamir (2012) to derive the explicit bidding functions of the bidders. In both cases we have a strong bidder and a weak bidder. We say that a bidder is stronger than another bidder if the distribution from which her valuation is drawn, …rst order stochastically dominates that of the other. When examining the sequential bidding auction we would therefore …rst need to determine what is the optimal (in terms of the seller's revenue) order of the bidders.
Ranking the auctions
For simultaneous bidding …rst price auction there are only limited results for the Bayesian equilibrium behavior of bidders. Kaplan and Zamir (2012) …nd the equilibrium behavior of two bidders with uniform distributions and general supports. Therefore we restrict attention to uniform distributions in order to be able to derive an explicit expression for the expected revenue in the Bayesian equilibrium of the simultaneous FPA.
Stretch of probabilities
Assume Therefore the optimal order (in terms of expected revenue) is when the stronger bidder bids …rst. We thus assume in the following that we are able to determine the order of the bidders and we let the weaker bidder bid second. Then we have
We use Kaplan and Zamir (2012) to derive the equilibrium bid function of the simultaneous bid FPA.
The inverse bid functions, v 1 (b) and v 2 (b) solve the following set of di¤erential equations: Therefore we have 
with a positive density function g (p). Therefore we have
In the SPA the bidders bid their valuation and then the random variable P (of the winning bid) is distributed on [0; c] with the following distribution function
and a density function
and therefore
Finally we also compare with the optimal auction that was derived by Myerson (1981) . Since the distribution functions are regular, the optimal allocation rule is such that a bidder gets the object if her virtual valuation is the highest and is positive. Therefore, bidder 1 gets the object if Otherwise the seller keeps the object. Only the winning bidder pays and she pays the smallest value that will result in her winning (the highest among the virtual value of the other player and the reserve price r i ). We therefore have
We are now ready to compare the auctions in terms of expected revenue. We already know from Maskin and Riley (2000) that the expected revenue from the second price auction is always lower than the expected revenue from the simultaneous …rst price auction. In other words R SP A (") < R F P A sim ("). We have the following two propositions Proposition 2 For every c, there exists a cut-o¤ 0 < " (c) c such that for all " < " (c) ; R In this case " (c) is de…ned by the equation
Note that we then have that whenever the ratio between the supports is lower than 1 1+" (1) ' 0:58 the sequential auction will yield higher expected revenue than the simultaneous one. Moreover, " (c) is de…ned by the equation 1 6
Therefore, whenever the ratio between the supports is lower than 1 1+" (1) ' 0:634 the sequential auction will yield higher expected revenue than the second price auction.
We therefore conclude that when the asymmetry is high enough, " > " (c) where " (c) < c, then the sequential bidding auction yields higher expected revenue than both simultaneous auctions.
In terms of e¢ ciency, however, the sequential bidding auction always yields lower e¢ ciency than the simultaneous auction if the stronger bidder bids …rst. We de…ne e¢ ciency as the probability that the winner is the bidder with the higher valuation. Recall that the simultaneous …rst price auction does not guarantee e¢ ciency when bidders are asymmetric since the weaker bidder bids more aggressively than the stronger one (less shading down bids) and then the weaker bidder may win although her valuation is lower than the stronger bidder's valuation. This phenomenon is also present in the sequential …rst price auction. When the weaker bidder bids second she has an advantage over the stronger one since she gets to observe his bid and can win by placing the same bid. This leads to cases where the weaker bidder wins although her valuation is lower than the stronger bidder's valuation. In the following we compare the e¢ ciency of the mechanisms.
For the second price auction we have When the asymmetry is very large the e¢ ciency in all auctions except for the optimal auction approaches
1.
Finally we discuss the di¤erences between the auctions in the eyes of the bidders. For each of the auctions we calculate the expected revenue of the strong bidder and the weak bidder. For the simultaneous SPA we
and ex ante we have
For the simultaneous FPA we have
For the sequential FPA we have, when 0 " c
and when c " then
Note that although the second bidder is the weaker one she enjoys a higher expected revenue for every type since she has the bene…t of bidding second. The ex ante expected payo¤ is given by 
We prove the following proposition Proposition 4 For every c and " we have
Proof. In the appendix
The above proposition establishes the fact that the weaker bidder prefers the sequential bidding auction over the two simultaneous bidding auctions while the stronger one does not. Therefore letting the weaker bidder bid after the stronger bidder bids, both increases her ex-ante expected payo¤ and the expected revenue of the seller (when the asymmetry is large enough). 
while if bidder 1 bids second then
Therefore the optimal order is again for the stronger bidder to bid …rst. We thus assume in the following that we are able to determine the order of the bidders and we let the weaker bidder bid second. Then we
We again use Kaplan and Zamir (2012) to derive the equilibrium bid function of the simultaneous bid FPA. We …rst note that if " 2c the stronger bidder will ensure winning by bidding c therefore the following is an equilibrium of the simultaneous FPA: 
with a density function g (p) :Therefore we have
pg (p) dp
Unfortunately we could not derive here the analytic expression of the revenue. However, we could numerically evaluate the integral for any set of parameters (c and "). if " p c
For c ", we have for 0 p c
We are now able to compare analytically the sequential auction only with the second price auction. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For every c, there exists a cut-o¤ 0 < " (c) < c such that for all " < " (c) ; R SP A > R Since we do not have the explicit expression for the revenue in the simultaneous FPA we can not prove a similar proposition to Proposition 2. However, for c = 1 we are able to plot the revenue as a function of ". Figure 6 demonstrates that indeed for some 1 " 2 we have R F P A < R F P A seq Note that for " 2c we have
Other Results
In this section we prove some negative general results for the sequential bidding model. Recall that bidder j's valuation of the object is denoted by v j and is private information to bidder j. It is common knowledge among the bidders that bidder j's valuation v j is drawn from a continuos and twice di¤erentiable distribution F j with a positive density function f j on the interval [a j ; c j ] ; 0 a j < c j . Since bidder i bids zero whenever her valuation is already below the maximum bid of bidders 1 up to i 1 and bides this maximum bid or above it whenever her valuation is higher than this maximum we get that in the PBE of the game, bidder j's maximization problem becomes
; s:t: b max
where F j are all de…ned on [min 1 j n a j ; max 1 j n c j ] such that F i 0 on [min 1 j n a j ; a i ] and F i 1 on
We can therefore easily construct a PBE for any number of bidders and any distributions.
Monotonicity in the number of bidders
As in the sequential all-pay auction in Segev and Sela (2014a) there exists no monotonicity of the revenue in the number of bidders. We prove the following result.
Proposition 6
In the sequential FPA there exist no monotonicity of the expected revenue in the number of bidders. In other words adding a bidder may decrease the expected revenue.
Proof. We have the following counter example. Assume two symmetric bidders such that F 1 and F 2 are uniform on [0; 1] we have
If we now add a strong bidder with F 3 uniform on ["; 1 + "] such that 0 " 1 and place her last then we have the following PBE:
Bidder 2's maximization problem is then
Otherwise, note that if b 1 (v 1 ) is positive then it is necessarily larger or equal to " and smaller or equal to 1 and therefore
Finally, when v 1 " bidder 1's maximization problem is
and when v 1 < " she bids zero. Therefore we have
We can now compute
In …gure 6 we plot both R 
Optimal order of the bidders
We emphasize that determining the optimal order is crucial in the sequential model. We prove next that it is not always optimal to place the strong bidder …rst. " 1 while R (1; 2) < R (2; 1) whenever 0 " < 
Concluding remarks
We analyze a sequential bidding …rst price auction and demonstrate that it may yield a higher expected revenue than both the simultaneous bidding …rst price auction and the second price auction when the stronger bidder bids …rst. We therefore argue that when there is reason to believe that bidders are asymmetric the seller may want to consider ordering them and let them bid one by one. By doing that she may not only increase the expected payo¤ of the weak bidder but also her expected revenue. If bidders are asymmetric enough we show that the sequential FPA may also increase e¢ ciency compared to the simultaneous FPA.
This happens however when the stronger bidder bids second.
The lower e¢ ciency achieved in the sequential bidding auction when the stronger bidder bids …rst is mainly due to the preferred position of the second bidder (when she is the weaker bidder) which allows her to win the auction easily by bidding the same bid as the …rst bidder. We leave for future research examining mechanisms that could potentially increase the e¢ ciency (when the revenue is already higher than in the simultaneous FPA) by reducing the second bidder's advantage. One such mechanism may be giving a head start to the …rst bidder. In Segev and Sela (2014b) we discuss head starts in the sequential all-pay auction in which the second bidder can win either by bidding strictly more than the …rst bidder by some constant (an additive head start) or by bidding the …rst bidder's bid multiplied by some constant larger than one (multiplicative head start) and show that head starts can increase both e¢ ciency and expected revenue.
Other such mechanisms may be a reserve price, a minimal bid or a winning bid mechanisms.
Other important questions such as determining the optimal order of bidders for a general number of bidders and general distributions are also still open and will have to be addressed in continuation research.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
For " = 0; R sim = 
Proof of Proposition 4
We …rst need to prove that 
